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Economic And Political Aspects
Of Extraterritorialityt
Controversies over the extraterritorial application of United States law
have taken on increasing importance in our foreign policy. Recall the
dispute in 1982 over U.S. sanctions against the Soviet natural gas pipeline.I
That problem was resolved, but the extraterritorial issue has arisen in other
contexts. We have had diplomatic and courtroom clashes with Switzerland,
for example, over foreign evidence production in the Marc Rich2 case, and
with Canada and a number of Caribbean jurisdictions in the Bank of Nova
Scotia3 cases. We have had disputes with other countries over application of
our re-export controls to goods within their jurisdictions.4 The private
*Formerly Deputy Secretary of State; currently, Vice President of IBM Corp.
tThis article-an edited and annotated version of an address delivered to the Section's
Committee on International Aspects of Antitrust Law, April 16, 1985 in Washington, D.C.-
was prepared in the author's capacity as Deputy Secretary.
1. The Soviet pipeline sanctions consisted of two phases. In December 1981, previously
existing foreign policy controls were expanded by requiring a validated license for exports to the
U.S.S.R. of commodities and technical data for the transmission or refinement of petroleum or
natural gas. (Validated licensing requirements previously applied only to oil and gas explora-
tion and production equipment and related technical data.) In addition, the Department of
Commerce suspended the processing of all licensing for exports to the U.S.S.R. and announced
that outstanding licenses and reexport authorizations were subject to review. See 47 Fed. Reg.
141 (1982) (amending 15 C.F.R. §§ 379, 385, 399).
In June 1982, controls on oil and gas goods and technology were further expanded to include
exports of non-U.S. origin goods and technical data by U.S. foreign subsidiaries as well as
exports of commodities produced abroad under licensing agreements with U.S. firms. See 47
Fed. Reg. 27250 (1982) (amending 15 C.F.R. §§ 376,379,385). This second phase provoked the
harshest criticisms from our allies.
2. In re Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 739 F.2d. 834 (2d Cir. 1984).
3. United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d. 1384 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 778 (1985).
4. The State Department has received confidential diplomatic demarches from our allies on,
for example, our foreign policy controls applicable to reexports of U.S. origin aircraft and parts
to Libya. See 15 C.F.R. § 385.7(d) (1984).
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Laker5 antitrust case and the grand jury investigation into alleged North
Atlantic aviation price-fixing have seized the attention of the highest levels
of the U.S. and British governments. Britain has invoked its Protection of
Trading Interests Act to forbid the production in Laker of any documents
held in that country.6
As a result of these and other experiences, the United States government
and a number of other governments have dedicated themselves to a sys-
tematic effort to manage the extraterritorial application of their law more
effectively. The problem naturally arises most acutely among friends and
close trading partners; we therefore share a powerful interest in not letting
the issue do harm to vital political relationships.
This article examines the origins of the problem, the general approach the
United States has adopted to manage it, and the two areas in which it is
particularly difficult-commercial and financial relations, and national
security and foreign policy trade controls.
I. Origins of the Extraterritoriality Problem
Extraterritoriality has become a bigger issue as the world economy has
grown more integrated. In a sense it is one of the by-products of the West's
success. People, goods, money, records, and information all move with
increasing frequency, speed, and ease across national boundaries. Amer-
ican direct investment abroad has soared; at the end of 1983 it totaled some
$226 billion,7 while foreign direct investment in the United States amounted
to $135 billion.8 Business dealings are more and more often transnational,
and the multinational corporation has burgeoned-a symbol of the eco-
nomic interdependence of our time. International trade as a proportion of
our Gross National Product has doubled since 1945. 9 Imports into the
United States have jumped in volume, value, and variety.
Our laws, and important national interests, require us to reach many
transnational activities in certain ways. For example, the legal regime of
antitrust and securities and commodities market regulation could be under-
mined if transactions across borders were beyond the reach of our legal
system. National security might be eroded if we could reach only the initial
5. See, e.g., Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d. 909 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 604 F. Supp. 280 (D.D.C. 1984).
6. E.g., Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Protection of Trading Interests, Order
1983 (June 27, 1983) (U.S. Antitrust Measures).
7. U.S. Department of Commerce, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, Aug. 1984, at 29.
8. US. Department of Commerce, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, Oct. 1984, at 27.
9. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, ECONOMIc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, Table B(1), 232-3
(Transmitted to the Congress, February, 1985) (based on data from the Department of
Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis).
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consignee of a sensitive export and had no right to impose foreign end-use or
end-user restrictions. 10
But when United States laws try to reach the activities of persons or the
use of property abroad, we are bound to run up against other nations' views
of their own sovereignty and national interests. Sometimes a foreign govern-
ment says that sovereignty means the exclusive right to reach persons and
things within its territory. The Swiss, for example, assert that only their
government can order production of records held in Switzerland.11 In the
Marc Rich case, they made this claim despite extensive U.S. contacts with
the case: the Swiss corporation was wholly owned by Americans, the trans-
actions allegedly were directed from a New York office, the oil was allegedly
sold to U.S. customers, and United States tax fraud was at issue. 12
Perhaps the toughest problem arises when we try to exercise authority, in
accordance with United States law and policy, over economic activity cen-
tered in another country. Our relationship with Canada today shows that
this is more than a philosophical abstraction. Approximately 70 percent of
Canada's oil and gas, 37 percent of its mining, and 47 percent of its manufac-
turing is owned by foreign nationals. 13 Americans own a controlling interest
in approximately 35 percent of Canadian industry. 14 Components and tech-
nology originating in the United States are used extensively in products
exported from Canada. Canadians fear that U.S. attempts to exercise
jurisdiction over persons and activities in Canada call into question Can-
ada's ability to govern within its own national boundaries. 15 The problem is
10. In the absence of U.S. reexport licensing provisions, an initial consignee in another
country could resell sensitive equipment to proscribed destinations. Controls on the reexport of
U.S.-origin goods are authorized by sections 5(a) and 6(a) of the Export Administration Act of
1979, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2404(a), 2405(a)(1982). The Export Administration Regulations
generally prohibit the reexport of goods previously exported from the United States. See 15
C.F.R. § 374.1(1984).
11. See generally, In re Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 739 F.2d. 834 (2d Cir. 1984).
12. The case involved an alleged 100 million dollar tax fraud scheme, based on a fraudulent
chain of oil transactions. The U.S. sought records kept at the company headquarters in
Switzerland and in many other foreign locations.
13. These figures are drawn from publications issued by the Government of Canada Petro-
leum Monitoring Agency and Statistics Canada.
14. Id.
15. Ambassador Gottlieb of Canada stated Canadian concerns in this manner:
If foreign law follows foreign capital, if the flag follows the national currency, if enterprises
located in a foreign country are subjected to controls which conflict with the laws and policies
of that foreign country, then a stage is reached where national sovereignty itself can be at
stake. Sovereignty here refers to the right and the ability of a national government to impose
its laws and policies-that is, to govern-within its national boundaries without undue or
unwarranted external interference.
The Ambassador went on to note, however, that
[the issue of extraterritoriality] is extremely difficult and there are no hard and fast general
answers. It is clear that in our interdependent world a dogmatic and exclusively territorial
approach to sovereignty-one that completely separates national jurisdictions-is not work-
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particularly difficult when it involves not merely competing claims of juris-
diction but conflicting substantive policies-as in the area of antitrust.
Conflicts over extraterritoriality have the potential for serious long-term
consequences. In the economic sphere, other countries are expressing re-
sistance to U.S. companies' participation in projects thought likely to be
subject to U.S. extraterritorial controls. 16 Some foreign manufacturers are
shifting to non-U.S. sources of supply for long-term industrial projects or
export-oriented manufacturing. 17 This is affecting U.S. companies'. partic-
ipation in joint ventures as well as their sales abroad. It is, of course, a
particular issue in sales of high technology items where export controls may
apply. The political and economic implications are so significant that they
could become a bigger threat to American economic interests than the
present concerns about tariffs, quotas, and exchange rates.
II. A Framework for Managing the Problem
When I addressed the annual meeting of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law two years ago,' 8 1 listed a number of steps to be taken to manage
the problem of extraterritoriality. They still provide a useful framework:
able; some extraterritoriality is inevitable and, sometimes, even desirable. However, it has to
be very limited. The international flow of trade and investment requires an appreciation of
the differences between the legal and regulatory frameworks of different nations. We must,
in the final analysis, know where one jurisdiction ends and another begins and we must
respect the lines of demarcation, as ill-defined and amorphous as they may be.
Address by Allan E. Gottlieb, Ambassador of Canada to the United States, New York
International Law Association (Nov. 12, 1982).
16. For example, in 1981 the United Kingdom's Monopolies and Mergers Commission
refused to allow a proposed merger of a U.K. firm with Enserch, a U.S. corporation, in part
because the Commission feared that the merger could subject the U.K. firm to the extraterrito-
rial application of U.S. laws, damaging the firm's export potential. MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS
COMMISSION, ENSERCH CORPORATION AND DAVY CORPORATION LIMITED: A REPORT ON THE
PROPOSED MERGER (1981), discussed in 2 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERI-
CAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 13.30 (Supp. 1984).
The French Aerospace Director, Michael Lagorce, also remarked, in an April 19, 1985
speech at the Aviation Club in Paris, that U.S. export policies can introduce distrust and
disarray into the marketing structure for civil aircraft.
17. At least one Asian telecommunications company decided against using American tech-
nology due to licensing delays and uncertainty. See, Jeffrey A. Tassey, Export Controls Can
Hurt National Security, Journal of Commerce, Oct. 11, 1984, at 4a col. 3. There is no reason to
think this is an isolated case: U.S. aerospace manufacturers have repeatedly complained to
State Department officials that U.S. export controls damage their international competitive-
ness and have resulted in declining market shares. Other industries where after-sale servicing
and supply of spare parts are a major factor in product choice, such as computers, electronic
equipment, and oil exploration and production equipment, have also reported significant
declines in their overseas market shares after the imposition of controls.
18. Address by the Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality, Con-
flicts of Jurisdiction and U.S. Foreign Policy (April 15, 1983) (delivered at the Annual Meeting
of the American Society of International Law).
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* First, continue efforts to resolve the policy differences that underlie
many of the conflicts;
* Second, develop appropriate guidelines for assertions of authority over
conduct abroad, such as an interest-balancing or comity approach;
* Third, expand the practice, pioneered in the antitrust area, of notice,
consultation and cooperation with foreign governments where contem-
plated actions raise a danger of conflicts;
" Fourth, expand international cooperative arrangements; and
" Fifth, increase opportunities for advance consultation by the Depart-
ment of State regarding U.S. regulatory or enforcement actions that
substantially involve other countries' interests.
These principles are being implemented. For example, we have strength-
ened the consensus with the COCOM countries on national security export
controls. 19 In addition, we have worked out a consensus in the OECD,
affirmed by the ministerial level meeting in May 1984, which reflects a good
part of this practical approach. 20 We have also had success, for example, in
working with other countries on law enforcement, where there is most likely
to be basic agreement on policies and goals. 21 The remainder of this article
focuses on two more controversial areas. The first is commercial and finan-
cial relations, and the second is national security and foreign policy trade
controls.
III. Commercial and Financial Relations
A. ANTITRUST
Antitrust presents vexing problems of extraterritoriality because it in-
volves differences in national competition policies, as well as rival national
economic interests. Antitrust was the area in which the practice of interna-
tional notice and consultation on potential extraterritoriality conflicts re-
ceived its main impetus. Arrangements for notice and consultation help us
consider the interests of the various countries involved in a competition
19. The list of commodities controlled by COCOM nations has recently been extensively
updated to focus controls on areas of greater concern. See infra note 34.
20. COMMIrEE ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, 1984
REVIEW OF THE OECD 1976 DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES (1984), reprinted in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVEL-
OPMENT, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 23-25 (1984) (Section
on Conflicting Requirements, Endorsed by Ministers on May 17, 1984).
21. Our recently concluded treaty with Canada, Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters, Mar. 18, 1985, United States-Canada, and our arrangement with the U.K. govern-
ment on interdicting British flag ships engaged in drug trafficking on the high seas, Agreement
on Narcotic Drugs-Interdiction of Vessels, Nov. 13, 1981, United States-United Kingdom,
T.I.A.S. No. 10296, are excellent examples of the closer international cooperation we have
achieved in law enforcement matters.
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case. In accordance with the OECD restrictive business practices
guidelines, 22 we have notified other countries over five hundred times of
antitrust enforcement activities. These are primarily domestic actions
affecting firms doing business in the United States, such as requests for
information often located here. In the bilateral context, we have reached
antitrust notice and assistance agreements with Canada and Australia,23 and
a more general antitrust agreement with West Germany. 24
We have been able to reach agreement with these countries because we
share a certain attitude towards competition policies and comity. But with
other nations, we have had more difficulty. The British Government, for
example, says we cannot legitimately impose United States competition
policy on commerce that is essentially bilateral. American and British
competition policies may differ over things as fundamental as the legality of
secret price-fixing.25 From our perspective, it is not clear why a balancing of
interests or comity analysis would favor allowing secret price-fixing on goods
and services in United States commerce. If, in the absence of an agreement
with Great Britain, we withhold application of our laws to a case where we
have jurisdiction, then the British policies will be applied unilaterally, by
default. Clearly this situation is unsatisfactory and remains a serious prob-
lem in our trade relations with Great Britain.
We face other complex questions in antitrust. One is the foreign impact of
private U.S. antitrust actions. American discovery practices are consider-
ably broader than those of most other legal systems. The possibility of huge
treble-damage awards can give plaintiffs in American courts valuable busi-
ness leverage against foreign companies. Further, such plaintiffs have the
option of retaining American lawyers on a contingency-fee basis, and they
run less risk of being assessed defendants' costs than in many foreign
jurisdictions.
One possible solution is a bill, S. 397, introduced by Senator DeConcini of
Arizona. 26 It would provide a mechanism for dropping treble damages in
22. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, RECOMMENDATION OF
THE COUNCIL CONCERNING CO-OPERATION BETWEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES ON RESTRICTIVE
BUSINESS PRACTICES AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Adopted by the Council at its 501st
Meeting on September 25, 1979), Doc. No. C(79)154 (Final) (Oct. 5, 1979).
23. Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Canada as to Notification, Consultation, and Cooperation
with Respect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws, March 9, 1984, United States-
Canada, 23 I.L.M. 275 (1984). Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June
29, 1982, United States-Australia, T.I.A.S. No. 10365.
24. Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices,
June 23, 1976, United States-Federal Republic of Germany, 27 U.S.T. 1956, T.I.A.S. No.
8291.
25. United Kingdom laws have no direct counterpart to the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1982) which prohibits, inter alia, price fixing agreements.
26. S. 397, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
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certain international cases, and would also legislate comity as a jurisdic-
tional rule in the antitrust area. The Reagan Administration has yet to
formulate a position on this legislation, and the bill does raise a number of
questions. Yet, it is clearly a thoughtful and serious initiative. While the
DeConcini bill may or may not provide the answers, it does provide a
desirable opportunity for interested legal, business and governmental par-
ties to focus on the question and make their views known.
B. UNITARY TAX
Another problem, but one on which significant progress has been made, is
the worldwide unitary tax method, under which our state governments have
adopted tax policies that differ from those of our trading partners. First, it
should be noted that the U.S. government does not consider worldwide
unitary taxation to be an extraterritorial application of U.S. federal or state
laws; it is a system used by some U.S. states to determine what income is
subject to taxation, not an attempt to regulate activities abroad.
Nevertheless, many of our trading partners have claimed that the unitary
tax now used by California and a number of other states27 is an extraterrito-
rial application of U.S. laws. They claim that it results in double taxation,
places other burdens on foreign commerce, and is inconsistent with the
generally accepted international practice of allocating income.
A Treasury Department Working Group, which included representatives
of state governments, studied the matter and recommended a "water's
edge" limitation on the states' use of the worldwide unitary tax method.2s
American corporations, and foreign corporations with substantial business
activities in this country, would still be subject to unitary taxation in some
states. Following the Working Group recommendation, several states re-
scinded or limited their unitary taxes, 29 and others are considering legisla-
tion to do the same. California, however, which originated the use of
worldwide unitary taxation, has not yet moved to the recommended "wa-
ter's edge" approach. In sum, while the unitary tax problem is not fully
resolved, it is one area where the federal government and individual state
governments have acted to meet the concerns of other countries.
27. In addition to California, Alaska, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, New Hampshire, and
Utah, all employ a worldwide unitary method of taxation. The Colorado legislature recently
passed a bill, which is now before the governor, which would modify their worldwide unitary
method of taxation.
28. See OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, THE FINAL REPORT OF THE
WORLDWIDE UNITARY TAXATION WORKING GROUP: CHAIRMAN'S REPORT AND SUPPLEMENTAL
VIEWS (1984).
29. Florida, Indiana, and Massachusetts have modified their worldwide unitary method of
taxation. Oregon has also done so, but the modification will not be effective until January 1,
1986.
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IV. National Security and Foreign
Policy Trade Controls
As in commercial relations, underlying policy differences play a critical
role in the conflicts over national security and foreign policy trade controls.
This is much more than an issue for the lawyers. It is one for the diplomats
and political leaders.
Extraterritoriality has become a major issue in the context of East-West
trade. It was once believed that such trade would be an incentive for the
Soviet Union to moderate its international behavior. Experience, however,
seems to indicate that it is the West that has been restrained more than the
Soviets. In addition, there has been concern that wider trade has given the
Soviet Union too much access to Western technology, both for direct
military application and for upgrading the technological base that sustains
the Soviet military establishment.
For these reasons, the United States has sought to limit Soviet access to
advanced technology. At the end of 1981, in response to the Soviet role in
the suppression of Solidarity in Poland, the United States halted Soviet
access to American equipment for the construction of the natural gas
pipeline from the Soviet Union to Western Europe. 30 In June 1982 controls
were extended to exports by U.S. subsidiaries and licensees operating
abroad. 31 The latter, of course, were foreign companies. These sanctions
led, in effect, to an extraterritoriality crisis.
The rift with our allies was resolved by diplomatic efforts to harmonize
policies. United States sanctions were lifted on November 13, 1982.32 A
concensus was reached among the major Western industrial nations on a
framework for future trade relations with the Soviet Union in products
having military or other strategic applications.
33
We have made good progress, working through COCOM mechanisms to
harmonize licensing and enforcement policies with our allies. The list of
items subject to multilateral controls is reviewed and updated every few
years; in the recently concluded 1982-1984 review, additional products such
as robotics, telecommunications switching equipment, and computer soft-
ware were included.34 We are working with other governments to improve
30. See supra note 1.
31. See supra note 1.
32. 47 Fed. Reg. 51858 (1982)(amending 15 C.F.R. §§ 379, 385, 390, 399).
33. The fact of this consensus was referred to in the Williamsburg Economic Summit
Conference Declaration on Economic Recovery, May 30, 1983, reprinted in I PUBLIC PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, RONALD REAGAN, 1983 798 (1984):
East-West economic relations should be compatible with our security interests. We take note
with approval of the work of the multilateral organizations which have in recent months
analyzed and drawn conclusions regarding the key aspects of East-West economic relations.
We encourage continuing work by these organizations, as appropriate. Id.
34. See 49 Fed. Reg. 50608 (1984) (amending 15 C.F.R. §§ 379, 386, 399). Pursuant to
COCOM review of strategic controls, this rule, inter alia, adds two new entries to the Commod-
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enforcement of export controls on sensitive goods and technology. Success
in these efforts should reduce the potential for conflict even further.
The issue of export controls has, of course, arisen outside the East-West
context. Last year our government imposed restrictions to interdict the flow
to Iraq and Iran of chemicals that could be used in the manufacture of
chemical weapons.35 As part of our effort to limit the role of Qaddafi's Libya
in international terrorism, we have instituted stringent export controls for
that country. 36 They cover national security items, certain oil and gas
equipment, and other products. We have tried to administer these controls
with due regard to the differing policies of our European allies and in regular
consultation with them.
You may also be aware that Congress is likely to enact a new Export
Administration Act soon.37 The bill tries to strike a proper balance between
commercial interests, the concerns of our allies and our own national
security and foreign policy interests. Let me list some of its highlights. First,
it would prevent the interruption of existing contracts or export licenses,
except in special circumstances. The President would be required to make
and report to the Congress certain findings before imposing controls.
Second, the bill would make more difficult the imposition or extension of
foreign policy and national security controls. Third, the bill would permit
the President to bar imports not only from companies violating U.S. na-
tional security controls, but also those violating COCOM export controls
under certain circumstances.
V. Conclusion
Within the U.S. Government, a consensus now exists that in deciding
whether or how to act, we should weigh conflicting interests, laws or policies
of foreign jurisdictions. The United States has a long-term national interest
in following this comity approach. There is also consensus within the gov-
ernment that consultation and cooperation regarding the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law must take place between other agencies and the
State Department.
ity Control List, the effect of which is to control certain software for computers and equipment,
as well as certain telecommunication equipment. Regulations governing robotics are to be
published sometime this summer.
35. 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(e)(1984).
36. 15 C.F.R. § 385.7(1984).
37. The Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended by 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-20
(1982), expired on March 30, 1984, and has been kept in force under the President's authorities,
including his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-6 (1982). See E.O. No. 12470,49 Fed. Reg. 13099 (1884): Presidential Notice of March
28, 1985, 50 Fed. Reg. 12513 (1985). Several bills to renew and amend the Export Administra-
tion Act have been introduced over the past year. The most recent incorporates agreements
reached in last year's conference. While controversial provisions remain, it is expected that the
bill will pass without major change. See S. 883, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
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Progress has been made. But we must continue working with our friends
and allies for a greater convergence of underlying policies. With such a
convergence, together with the informed support of the international bar,
and the pooling of our collective legal, economic, and diplomatic expertise,
I am confident that we will make further progress in managing the problem
of extraterritoriality.
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